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"CRAMDOWN" CONFIRMATION OF SINGLE-ASSET
DEBTOR REORGANIZATION PLANS THROUGH SEPARATE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE DEFICIENCY CLAIM-HOW IN
RE U.S. TRUCK CO.' WAS RUN OFF THE ROAD
Fifteen years after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code (the
Code),2 controversy over the plan confirmation process for sin-
gle-asset debtors3 in Chapter 11 reorganizations has reached a
fever pitch. A particularly volatile issue today is the practice of
separately classifying the unsecured deficiency claim of an
undersecured creditor4 from the claims of other unsecured credi-
tors for the purpose of "cramming down"5 the debtor's proposed
1. 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
3. The "single-asset" debtor is one who holds real estate as its primary, if not
only, asset. Typically, the real estate served as security for a mortgage loan facilitat-
ing the purchase of the property. In addition, the single-asset debtor's trade debts
tend to be minimal. See Stephen W. Sather & Adrian M. Overstreet, The Single-
Asset Real Estate Debtor: A Selective Overview, 2 J. BANKR. L. PRAC. 343, 343
(1993); infra notes 31-63 and accompanying text.
4. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 1111(b) (1988). Section 506(a) grants an undersecured
creditor a secured claim up to the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim in
the amount of its deficiency unless the creditor qualifies for and elects treatment
under § 1111(b). If it elects such treatment, it has a secured claim up to the full
amount of the indebtedness.
Code § 506(a) provides, in relevant part:
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property . . .
is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in
the estate's interest in such property . . . and is an unsecured claim to
the extent that the value of such creditor's interest . . . is less than the
amount of such allowed claim.
Id. § 506(a).
Code § 1111(b) provides, in relevant part:
(1)(A) A claim secured by a lien on property of the estate shall be
allowed or disallowed under section 502 of this title the same as if the
holder of such claim had recourse against the debtor on account of such
claim, whether or not such holder has such recourse ....
(2) If such an election is made, then notwithstanding section 506(a)
of this title, such claim is a secured claim to the extent that such claim
is allowed.
Id. § 1111(b).
5. See id § 1129(b). "Cramdown" refers to the use of § 1129(b) to obtain plan
confirmation. Section 1129(b) operates to excuse the otherwise required acceptance of
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reorganization plan past the objections of the undersecured
creditor. This separate classification strategy enables the debtor
to gain acceptance from an impaired,' non-insider class of
claims, a prerequisite to plan confirmation.8 Depending upon
which court hears the case, such separate classification amounts
to either an improper manipulation of the Code's voting process9
or a legitimate use of the Code's unambiguous provisions on
reorganization.'
The Third," Fourth, 2 Fifth," and Eighth 4 Circuits have
rejected the separate classification strategy as abusive of the
bankruptcy process, and numerou lower courts have followed
suit." The foundation for this line of cases, Phoenix Mutual
all impaired classes of creditors, see id. § 1129(a){8), so long as the plan "does not
discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims
or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan," id. § 1129(b);
see infra notes 79-111 and accompanying text. See generally Kenneth Klee, All You
Ever Wanted To Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988). Section 1124 provides that "a class of claims or inter-
ests is impaired under the plan unless, with respect to each claim or interest of
such class, the plan-(1) leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights
to which such claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest." Id.
7. Id. § 101(31). Section 101(31) defines an insider as, essentially, an individual
or an entity associated with the debtor. Id.
8. Id. § 1129(a)(10). Section 1129(a)(10) provides that:
(a) The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following re-
quirements are met:
(10) If a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least one
class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan,
determined without including any acceptance of the plan by any insider.
Id.
9. See Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone
III Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72
(1992); Peter E. Meltzer, Disenfranchising the Dissenting Creditor Through Artificial
Classification or Artificial Impairment, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 281, 301-02 (1992).
10. See, e.g., In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
11. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Route 37 Business Park Assocs., 987 F.2d
154 (3d Cir. 1993).
12. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Properties, XVIII (In re Bryson Properties, XVIII),
961 F.2d 496 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992).
13. Greystone, 995 F.2d 1274.
14. Lumber Exch. Bldg. Ltd. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (In re Lumber Exch. Bldg.
Ltd.), 968 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1992).
15. E.g., California Fed. Bank v. Moorpark Adventure (In re Moorpark Adventure),
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Life Insurance Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone
III Joint Venture),16 provided the catch phrase for separate
classification opponents, declaring that "thou shalt not classify
similar claims differently in order to gerrymander an affirmative
vote on a reorganization plan."17 However, in 1993, three bank-
ruptcy courts asserted that the Code permits, and may in fact
require, the separate classification strategy." More recently,
the Seventh Circuit openly repudiated Greystone,9 and the
Fifth Circuit apparently has softened its prior stance in
Greystone.2° Clearly, the more persuasive argument supports
these latest challenges to Greystone's commandment.
Ironically, the first case to address such a separate classifica-
tion controversy, Teamsters National Freight Industry Negotiat-
ing Committee v. U.S. Truck Co. (In re U.S. Truck Co.),2" of-
fered guidance that future courts foolishly ignored.22 The U.S.
Truck decision permitted the separate classification of claims,
even if admittedly done for the purpose of achieving plan confir-
161 B.R. 254 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993); Boston Post Rd. Ltd. Partnership v. FDIC (In
re Boston Post Rd. Ltd. Partnership), 154 B.R. 617 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1993); In re
500 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 148 B.R. 1010 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Roswell-Hannover Joint Venture (In re Roswell-Hannover Joint Ven-
ture), 149 B.R. 1014 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992); In re Cantonwood Assocs. Ltd. Partner-
ship, 138 B.R. 648 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992).
16. 995 F.2d 1274.
17. Id. at 1279.
18. In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993); In re D & W Realty
Corp., 156 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd, 165 B.R. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); In
re ZRM-Okla. Partnership, 156 B.R. 67, 71 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993).
19. In re Woodbrook Assocs., 19 F.3d 312, 318 (7th Cir. 1994).
20. Heartland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Briscoe Enters., Ltd., II (In re Briscoe
Enters., Ltd., II), 994 F.2d 1160, 1167 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the debtor's
separate classification of the undersecured creditor's deficiency claim was justified
under the circumstances).
21. 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986). Although U.S. Truck did not involve a single-
asset debtor, the court was nevertheless presented with the issue of the propriety of
separate classification as a strategy to effect a Chapter 11 plan confirmation. Id. at
584.
22. Although Greystone purported to rely on U.S. Truck in delivering its "one clear
rule" condemning separate classification for the purpose of "gerrymander[ing],"
Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1279, it is not at all clear that the court in U.S. Truck,
which confirmed a plan that used the separate classification strategy, would have
approved of such an interpretation. See U.S. Truck, 800 F.2d at 586 n.8 (noting that
the debtor's purpose in employing separate classification in this case was admittedly
"to line up the votes in favor of the plan").
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mation, provided that the separated classes of claimants pos-
sessed distinct interests in the outcome of the reorganization.23
This holding balanced a respect for both the classification flexi-
bility obviously intended by the wording of the Code24 and the
congressional intent that lay behind the requirement of one
assenting, impaired class.25 The U.S. Truck case, this Note will
suggest, provides the best framework for resolving classification
issues in the future.
This Note examines the Bankruptcy Code provisions relating
to the rights of secured creditors, the classification of claims,
and the confirmation of reorganization plans. Several circuit
court decisions have ruled on these issues, and recent bankrupt-
cy court decisions have allowed the separate classification strate-
gy. In analyzing these cases, this Note weighs the policy ramifi-
cations of each potential outcome. The Note concludes that (1)
the Code's classification and confirmation provisions " do not
prohibit the separate classification of like claims,27 (2) the sepa-
rate classification of unsecured deficiency claims and other unse-
cured claims is mandated in any case because these claims are
dissimilar in their legal rights,2 and (3) in light of the bank-
ruptcy system's goal of balancing the interests of creditors with
the interest in facilitating reorganizations to preserve going
concern value,29 the wisest policy is to require that claims be
23. U.S. Truck, 800 F.2d at 586-87.
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1988). Section 1122 provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a plan may
place a claim or an interest in a particular class only if such claim or
interest is substantially similar to the other claims or interests of such
class.
(b) A plan may designate a separate class of claims consisting only
of every unsecured claim that is less than or reduced to an amount that
the court approves as reasonable and necessary for administrative conve-
nience.
Id.
25. See id. § 1129(a)(10); Linda J. Rusch, Gerrymandering the Classification Issue
in Chapter Eleven Reorganizations, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 163, 185-89 (1992); infra
notes 116-27 and accompanying text (discussing § 1129(a)(10) and its legislative
history).
26. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122, 1129 (i988).
27. E.g., In re ZRM-Okla. Partnership, 156 B.R. 67, 70 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993).
28. E.g., In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202, 218-19 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
29. Linda J. Rusch, Single Asset Cases and Chapter 11: The Classification Quan-
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classified together only to the extent that the claim-holders pos-
sess substantially similar interests.
THE ISSUE
The purpose of this Note is to examine the separate classifica-
tion issue in the context of the single-asset real estate case. The
recently-proposed bankruptcy reform legislation would define
single-asset real estate as "real property, other than residential
real property with fewer than 4 residential units, which gener-
ates substantially all of the gross income of a debtor and on
which no business is being conducted by a debtor other than the
business of operating the real property and activities incident
thereto.. . .3' Typically, the debtor is a partnership formed to
operate a hotel or office building and has suffered substantially
from a decline in real estate property values.
When a single-asset real estate debtor files a petition under
Chapter 11 of the Code, it generally does so because it has de-
faulted on the mortgage secured by the property and seeks to
avoid foreclosure by its mortgagee.3 In general, the debtor has
good relationships with its trade creditors who hold only mini-
mal claims at the time of the filing.34
The present controversy results from the fact that the inter-
ests of the undersecured mortgagee, who generally opposes any
plan of reorganization, 5 are different from those of the trade
dory, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 43, 58-59 (1993).
30.. See Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In
re U.S. Truck Co.), 800 F.2d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 1986).
31. S. 8247, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 211(a)(2) (1992).
32. See, e.g., In re D & W Realty Corp., 156 B.R. 140, 144 n.9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1993), rev'd, 165 B.R. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Sather & Overstreet, supra note 3, at
343-45.
33. Sather & Overstreet, supra note 3, at 343-45. The automatic stay provided by
Code § 365 prevents the foreclosure during the pendency of the bankruptcy case. 11
U.S.C. § 365 (1988).
34. For example, in the landmark Greystone case, the trade creditors held claims
totaling only $10,000, while the undersecured creditors deficiency claim was about
$3.5 million. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re
Greystone III Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 72 (1992).
35. An undersecured creditor possesses this motivation because it desires to con-
tinue its proceedings against the property under state law, which it sees as more
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creditors, who likely support the debtor's plan. 6 As discussed
further below,37 the classification issue arises out of the plan
confirmation requirement that at least one impaired class of
creditors accept a plan of reorganization." If the debtor's plan
places the undersecured creditor's deficiency claim in the same
class as the claims of the trade creditors, the size of the defi-
ciency claim usually will enable the undersecured creditor to
block acceptance of the plan by that class.39 On the other hand,
if the unsecured deficiency claim is placed in a class separate
from the other unsecured claims, the debtor likely will gain
acceptance of the plan by the class including only the trade
creditors and will have met the confirmation requirement of
acceptance by at least one impaired class."
favorable. Rusch, supra note 25, at 166-68 & n.18. In fact, the laws of every state
enforce a mortgagee's valid contractual right to foreclose upon collateral pursuant to
a default by the mortgagor. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924 (West 1993). In some in-
stances, the undersecured creditor, desiring to end its association with the debtor,
may prefer its state law remedy even though it will provide a lower payout than
the proposed plan of reorganization. Rusch, supra note 25, at 168 n.18.
36. Trade creditor support is generally the result of favorable treatment, usually
bordering on non-impairment. See, e.g., In re ZRM-Okla. Partnership, 156 B.R. 67,
68 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993).
37. See infra notes 97-111 and accompanying text.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (1988). For the language of § 1129(a)(10), see supra
note 8.
39. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1988). Section 1126 provides that a class accepts the
plan if creditors "that hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in
number of the allowed claims" in that class vote to accept the plan, provided there
is no bad faith. Id. §§ 1126(c), 1126(e).
Importantly, if the other unsecured creditors can outvote the undersecured credi-
tor; the plan will likely be accepted by that class even without separate classifica-
tion. Similarly, if there is another accepting class of claims whose existence is not
subject to objection by the undersecured creditor, then the separate classification
issue is moot. See Rusch, supra note 25, at 166-75.
40. See, e.g., ZRM-Okla., 156 B.R. at 68.
Another issue, beyond the scope of this Note, is that of "artificial impairment"
to achieve the required impaired accepting class. See Windsor on the River Assocs.,
Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Finance, Inc. (In re Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7
F.3d 127, 130-32 (8th Cir. 1993); Meltzer, supra note 9, at 310-21. "Artificial impair-
ment" describes a debtor's strategy whereby the plan proposes a slight alteration in
the rights of the class of general unsecured creditors despite the availability of re-
sources sufficient to leave that class unimpaired. Windsor, 7 F.3d at 131. The class
of general unsecured claims is, therefore, an impaired class, see 11 U.S.C. § 1124
(1988), and may cast its vote for the debtor's plan, allowing compliance with Code §
1129(a)(10), id. § 1129(a)(10). However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held
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The traditional arguments in favor of permitting single-asset
debtors to classify the unsecured portion of an undersecured
creditor's claim separately from the other unsecured claims focus
on the strict interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code encouraged
in several Supreme Court decisions.41 Accordingly, separate
classification is permissible because the Code does not explicitly
prohibit it, even in those instances where the debtor intends
thereby to create the assenting impaired class required by the
confirmation provisions.42 In addition, debtors have argued
that, for a variety of reasons, unsecured deficiency claims are
dissimilar from other unsecured claims and therefore must be
classified separately.43
Single-asset, undersecured creditors, however, maintain that
the Code provisions concerning the classification of claims" and
plan confirmation requirements45 make it clear that substan-
tially similar claims should be part of the same class.46 They
dispute assertions that their deficiency claims are legally dif-
ferent from general, unsecured claims and contend that there is
no basis for the separate classification.47
With respect to the policy debate, single-asset debtors argue
that separate classification allows them to retain some leverage
in the reorganization negotiations by leaving open the possibility
recently that "for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10), a claim is not impaired if the
alteration of rights in question arises solely from the debtor's exercise of discretion."
Windsor, 7 F.3d at 132 (rejecting confirmation of the debtor's plan).
41. E.g., Toibb v. Radloff, 507 U.S. 157, 160 (1991) (holding that "the plain lan-
guage of the Bankruptcy Code disposes of the question before us"); United States v.
Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989) (insisting that "the plain mean-
ing of legislation should be conclusive").
42. In re ZRM-Okla. Partnership, 156 B.R. 67, 70-71 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993).
43. In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202, 214-15, 218-19 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993); In re
D & W Realty Corp., 156 B.R. 140, 141 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd, 165 B.R. 127
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
Recall that Code § 1122, with one exception, allows only "substantially similar"
claims to be classified together. 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1988).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1988). For the language of Code § 1122, see supra note 24.
45. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1988); see infra notes 80-111 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Properties, XVIII (In re Bryson Proper-
ties, XVIII), 961 F.2d 496, 501-02 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992);
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III Joint
Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1278-81 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992).
47. See, e.g., Bryson, 961 F.2d at 501-02; Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1278-81.
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of a plan confirmation by cramdown." If debtors are not per-
mitted to classify the claims in this manner, they argue, the
undersecured creditor will routinely dominate the confirmation
proceedings as a result of its ability to block any proposed plan
of reorganization.49 The undersecured creditors have a simple
response: "Exactly!" In other words, they contend that it is en-
tirely proper for an undersecured creditor to dominate the con-
firmation process if its voting power under the Code allows it to
do so.5
As discussed below,51 three recent, single-asset real estate
decisions by the Bankruptcy Court upheld the separate classifi-
cation of the mortgagee's deficiency claim. In In re ZRM-Oklaho-
ma Partnership,52 the court held that the plain meaning of the
relevant Code provision, section 1122, simply does not prohibit
separate classification of similar claims.53 Taking a different
approach, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York held in In re D & W Realty Corp.54 that such a sepa-
rate classification scheme is not only permitted, but required by
related provisions of the Code.5 In addition, the court in In re
SM 104 Ltd.56 found that unsecured deficiency claims are fun-
damentally dissimilar from general unsecured claims and that
these two types of claims, therefore, cannot be classified together
by the terms of Code section 1122(a). 7
At stake in this debate is the ability of single-asset debtors to
use the Chapter 11 reorganization provisions. Should the circuit
court cases denying single-asset debtors the ability to employ
separate classification prevail, the ensuing domination of such
cases by undersecured creditors will effectively remove the
48. Sather & Overstreet, supra note 3, at 370.
49. Rusch, supra note 29, at 60.
50. Meltzer, supra note 9, at 305-06.
51. See infra notes 182-98 and accompanying text.
52. 156 B.R. 67 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993).
53. See id. at 70; supra note 24 (excerpting statutory language).
54. 156 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
55. Id. at 141.
56. 160 B.R. 202 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
57. Id. at 218-19. The opinion in In re SM 104 Ltd. was persuasive in the Sev-
enth Circuit's recent decision to join the opposition to Greystone. See In re
Woodbrook Assocs., 19 F.3d 312, 318-19 (7th Cir. 1994).
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Chapter 11 alternative for single-asset debtors" because the
undersecured creditor will have the power to block confirmation
of any plan by the debtor, severely limiting the prospect of reor-
ganization. 9 On the other hand, proponents of the separate
classification strategy predict that it will merely allow single-
asset debtors a fair chance to reorganize.0 They argue that
"[n]egotiation is most likely to occur in a situation where there
is uncertainty"6' and that prohibition of the separate classifica-
tion strategy removes any doubt about the outcome of the
case.62 Finally, single-asset debtors claim they merely wish to
use Chapter 11 as it is written.63
THE CODE
As with most statutory subjects, an overview of the relevant
Code provisions must precede the analysis of the separate classi-
fication issue. In particular, the treatment of secured creditors
under the Chapter 11 reorganization provisions creates friction
when single-asset real estate cases enter bankruptcy.
Code section 506(a) provides that, for bankruptcy purposes, a
secured creditor has a secured claim "to the extent of the value
of such creditor's interest" in the encumbered property.' In
addition, if the value of the collateral is less than the amount of
the creditor's claim (the creditor is undersecured) section 506(a)
grants the creditor an unsecured claim to the extent of the defi-
ciency.65 In other words, an undersecured creditor will have its
claim bifurcated into a secured claim and an unsecured claim,
and the present value of the encumbered property is the upper
limit of the secured claim.66
58. See Rusch, supra note 29, at 43-45.
59. Id. at 45. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
60. Sather & Overstreet, supra note 3, at 370.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., In re ZRM-Okla. Partnership, 156 B.R. 67, 70-71 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1993) (arguing that § 1122 does not prohibit separate classification of similar
claims).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988). For the language of § 506(a) see supra note 4.
65. Id. § 506(a) (1988).
66. Id.
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In a Chapter 11 case, however, Code section 1111(b) gives the
holder of a secured claim an alternative to the section 506(a)
claim bifurcation process. 7 Section 1111(b) provides that if the
"class of which such claim is a part [so] elects,"6 the claim may
be treated as secured to the full extent that the claim is allowed
notwithstanding section 506(a).69 If this election is made, al-
though the creditor retains a lien against the property in the full
amount of the indebtedness, there is no unsecured claim, and
the separate classification issue is not implicated." A secured
creditor will elect treatment under this section to prevent being
"cashed out" by the debtor, who must pay only the present value
of the collateral to retire the lien if the creditor has chosen to
stay with the claim bifurcation process.7
In the typical single-asset real estate case, because of the de-
cline in property values, the mortgagee may be vastly
undersecured.72 Thus, assuming it does not elect treatment un-
der section 1111(b)(2), the mortgagee will often have a large
unsecured deficiency claim.73 The manner in which the debtor
addresses such claims in its plan of reorganization determines
whether the separate classification issue arises.
A debtor's plan of reorganization must place each claim into a
class.74 As the Code section prescribing the classification of
67. Id. § 1111(b). For the language of § 1111(b), see supra note 4. Note that §
1111(b)(1) also "creates a right of similar recourse in favor of lenders whose claims
would otherwise be non-recourse," Meltzer, supra note 9, at 297, a situation common
to the single-asset real estate case, see, e.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Route 37 Business Park Assocs., 987 F.2d 154, 155 (3d Cir. 1993).
68. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(A)(i) (1988).
69. Id. § 1111(b)(2).
70. Id.; Rusch, supra note 29, at 45.
71. Rusch, supra note 25, at 175-80. Rusch notes that a secured creditor will not
make the § 1111(b) election, but will seek to defeat the separate classification strate-
gy, "(a) when the property will depreciate after confirmation and the debtor is likely
to default on the plan, or (b) when the property will appreciate after confirmation
and the debtor is not likely to default on the plan." Id. at 180.
72. See In re D & W Realty Corp., 156 B.R. 140, 144 n.9 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993),
rev'd, 165 B.R. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
73. Id.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1) (1988). In addition, § 1123(a)(4) provides that a plan
must "provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class,
unless the holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less favorable treat-
ment .... " Id. § 1123(a)(4).
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claims, section 1122 naturally has been the focus of much of the
controversy regarding plans that classify undersecured deficien-
cy claims separately from general unsecured claims. 5 Section
1122 is a rather simple Code provision:
Section 1122. Classification of claims or interests.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a
plan may place a claim or an interest in a particular class
only if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the
other claims or interests of such class.
(b) A plan may designate a separate class of claims con-
sisting only of every unsecured claim that is less than or
reduced to an amount that the court approves as reasonable
and necessary for administrative convenience. 6
Obviously, this section prohibits the placing of unlike claims
together in one class." In addition, the exception in section
1122(b) for "administrative convenience" provides that unsecured
claims below a court-approved amount, even if dissimilar, may
be classified together."8
75. See, e.g., Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re
Greystone III Joint Venture), 95 F.2d 1274, 1277-78 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 72 (1992); Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck
Co. (In re U.S. Truck Co.), 800 F.2d 581, 584-85 (6th Cir. 1986); In re SM 104 Ltd.,
160 B.R. 202, 216-21 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993); D & W Realty, 156 B.R. at 143.
76. 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1988).
77. See id. § 1122(a).
78. Id. § 1122(b). The exception in § 1122(b), therefore, would appear to be irrele-
vant to the issue of separate classification of similar claims. Nevertheless, the Fifth
Circuit has held that a reading of § 1122(a) that would permit the separate classifi-
cation of similar claims would render § 1122(b) "superfluous." Greystone, 995 F.2d at
1278 (noting that such a reading is therefore improper). The court in Greystone rea-
soned that, if § 1122(a) may be read to require classification of all similar claims in
one class, then the exception in § 1122(b) should be interpreted as allowing small
claims to be split away from their otherwise mandatory class. Id. It follows that
reading § 1122(a) to allow separate classification of similar claims would make the
exception in § 1122(b) unnecessary, thus providing evidence that such an interpreta-
tion of § 1122(a) is invalid.
Of course, any interpretation of one part of a statute that would render another
part of the statute unnecessary would be evidence that such a construction is im-
proper. Id. at 1278. However, § 1122(b) is an exception to § 1122(a) that expressly
prohibits only the placement of dissimilar claims in a single class. Even if § 1122(a)
is read to allow separate classification of similar claims, it would remain true that §
1122(b) could be read to mean that no dissimilar claims could be classified together
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Despite this apparent clarity, courts have failed to reach an
agreement over the degree of latitude a debtor has in filing a
plan that separately classifies substantially similar claims. 9
The classification issue is significant, however, only for the role
it plays in a debtor's attempt to achieve confirmation of its reor-
ganization plan. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the confir-
mation process before discussing the dynamics of the debate
over separate classification.
To obtain confirmation of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan, a
debtor must meet a number of requirements set out in Code
section 1129.8" Subsection 1129(a) establishes the regular meth-
od of confirmation, and subsection 1129(b) creates the
"cramdown" alternative."1 The distinction between the two
methods is that under section 1129(a)(8) each class of claims
that is impaired82  under the plan must accept 3 it. 4
Conversely, the cramdown method under section 1129(b) re-
moves this requirement, requiring instead that the plan "does
not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect
to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and
has not accepted, the plan."85 The plan must still meet all of
the requirements of the regular method other than section
1129(a)(8) in order to be confirmed by cramdown8
Section 1129(a) grants the court some discretion in the confir-
except as provided for in § 1122(b). Thus, the "administrative convenience" exception
is not superfluous, regardless of the amount of latitude given to debtors to place
similar claims in separate classes. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
79. E.g., California Fed. Bank v. Moorpark Adventure (In re Moorpark Adventure),
161 B.R. 254, 258 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993) (declining to follow the persuasive author-
ity of In re D & W Realty Corp., 156 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd, 165
B.R. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1988).
81. Id.
82. Id. § 1124. For the language of § 1124, see supra note 6.
83. 11 U.S.C. § 1126; see supra note 39.
84. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8). Section 1129(a)(8) provides that:
(8) With respect to each class of claims or interests-
(A) such class has accepted the plan; or
(B) such class is not impaired under the plan.
Id.
85. Id. § 1129(b)(1).
86. Id.
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mation process by mandating that both the plan"7 and its
proponent8 comply with all applicable provisions of the Code
and by establishing a good faith requirement. 9 Although some
creditors have argued that use of the cramdown provision to
confirm a plan over the objection of the undersecured senior
lender may constitute bad faith in itself," courts generally ac-
knowledge that the good faith standard demands only a genuine
intent to reorganize.9' Thus, if a debtor truly intends to reorga-
nize, separate classification to achieve a cramdown is improper
only if it is limited b a provision other than the good faith re-
quirement. 2
Another significant requirement for confirmation by either
method is the "best interests" test found in section 1129(a)(7). 3
This test, which protects individual claimholders rather than
members of a class, establishes a minimum amount that an indi-
87. Id. § 1129(a)(1).
88. Id. § 1129(a)(2).
89. Id. § 1129(a)(3).
90. Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Little Creek
Dev. Co.), 779 F.2d 1068, 1072-73 (5th Cir. 1986). See generally Brian S. Katz, Sin-
gle-Asset Real Estate Cases and the Good Faith Requirement: Why Reluctance To Ask
Whether a Case Belongs in Bankruptcy May Lead to the Incorrect Result, 9 BANKR.
DEVS. J. 77 (1992) (discussing factors courts consider as indicative of bad faith).
91. See Albany Partners Ltd. v. Westbrook (In re Albany Partners, Ltd.), 749 F.2d
670, 674 (11th Cir. 1984); Sather & Overstreet, supra note 3, at 358-60.
92. Sather & Overstreet, supra note 3, at 358-60.
93. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7). Section 1129(a)(7) provides that:
(7) With respect to each impaired class of claims or interests-
(A) each holder of a claim or interest of such class-
(i) has accepted the plan; or
(ii) will receive or retain under the plan on account of such claim
or interest property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that
is not less than the amount that such holder would so receive or retain
if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date;
or
(B) if section 1111(b)(2) of this title applies to the claims of such
class, each holder of a claim of such class will receive or retain under
the plan on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective
date of the plan, that is not less than the value of such holder's interest
in the estate's interest in the property that secures such claims.
Id.
This test is a carryover from Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, the Code's
predecessor. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 366(2), 30 Stat. 544 (repealed
1979).
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vidual claimholder must be paid under a plan not accepted by
that individual claimholder.94 Such a dissenting claimholder
must receive property of a value not less than that which that
claimholder would receive if the case were a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion." A plan that meets this test is, therefore, in the "best in-
terests" of the creditors in that each one has either accepted the
plan or will do no worse than if the debtor were liquidated."
The crux of the controversy over the classification issue is the
requirement of section 1129(a)(10) that at least one impaired,
non-insider class accept the plan before it can be confirmed. 7
Acceptance of the reorganization plan requires that (1) a majori-
ty of the class members and (2) members of the class repre-
senting two-thirds of the dollar amount of the class' claims vote
to accept the plan.98 Accordingly, a creditor with a large claim
relative to the class has greater influence over the outcome of
the vote. The undersecured lender in a single-asset case general-
ly will vote against the plan, and, because such a lender likely
will have a large claim, its class probably will reject the plan.9
Thus, the debtor, despite the support of the individual holders of
the other unsecured claims, is almost certain to fail the section
1129(a)(8) requirement of acceptance by all impaired classes and
will be forced to attempt to gain confirmation of the plan
through the cramdown method.""' Classifying the deficiency
94. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988).
95. Id.; see id. §§ 701-766 (1988). A liquidation analysis (a study of how the
debtor's assets would be distributed under a Chapter 7 proceeding) is the basis for
determining compliance with the best interests test. See JAMES J. WHITE & RAY-
MOND T. NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 555 (2d ed. 1992).
96. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
97. Id. § 1129(a)(10); Meltzer, supra note 9, at 301.
98. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(c), 1126(e) (1988).
99. See, e.g., Heartland Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Briscoe Enters., Ltd. II (In re
Briscoe Enters., Ltd. II), 994 F.2d 1160, 1166 (5th Cir.) (noting that the
undersecured creditor's $10 million deficiency claim would prevent a class that in-
cluded all unsecured creditors from approving the plan), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 550
(1993).
Recall that if the undersecured creditor's unsecured deficiency claim is not large
enough to out vote the other unsecured creditors, or if there is yet another im-
paired, accepting class, then the debtor's plan will succeed in achieving cramdown
confirmation, at least as far as § 1129(a)(10) is concerned, despite the dissent of the
undersecured creditor. Rusch, supra note 29, at 45.
100. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1988); infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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claim separately from the other (supportive) unsecured creditors
presents a means of compliance with section 1129(a)(10),''
which must be satisfied even under the cramdown method. 10 2
Interestingly, as discussed below, both sides of this debate point
to section 1129(a)(10) to support their cause."°3
The remaining relevant provision of section 1129(a) is subsec-
tion (11), which requires that "[c]onfirmation of the plan is not
likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further
financial reorganization, of the debtor .. .,."4 The plan, there-
fore, must be feasible.0 5  Advocates of the separate
classification strategy often cite this provision to emphasize that
single-asset debtors in this situation seek only to proceed with a
plan that the court has found likely to work.0 6 The feasibility
requirement is also heralded as one of several protections for a
creditor facing cramdown, which militates in favor of allowing
flexible classification.'
0 7
The cramdown provision of the Code maintains all of the re-
quirements of section 1129(a)-except the requirement of accep-
101. The unsecured creditors other than the undersecured creditor are, for the most
part, trade creditors who will approve the plan in the hope of continuing to do busi-
ness with the debtor. Meltzer, supra note 9, at 300. This accepting class effects the
debtor's compliance with Code § 1129(a)(10), despite the dissent of the separately
classified deficiency claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10).
102. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1988).
103. See Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone
III Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1278 (5th Cir. 1991) (insisting that allowing sepa-
rate classification defeats the congressional intent behind § 1129(a)(10) that there be
support for the plan among more than a single impaired creditor), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 72 (1992); In re ZRM-Okla. Partnership, 156 B.R. 67, 68 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1993) (noting that if Congress had wanted to give the majority or the largest credi-
tor veto power over confirmation proceedings it could have done so explicitly but
that the Code provides for no such thing).
104. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988).
105. See Heartland Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Briscoe Enters., Ltd., II (In re
Briscoe Enters., Ltd. II), 994 F.2d 1160, 1165-66 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
550 (1993). Courts have interpreted this "feasibility" requirement to mandate no less
than "a reasonable assurance of commercial viability . . . ." Id. at 1166 (quoting In
re Lakeside Global II, Ltd., 116 B.R. 499, 507 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989)).
106. See Rusch, supra note 29, at 56-58.
107. Id. at 56-57 (noting that creditors who oppose the separate classification strat-
egy are seeking to substitute their judgment on the feasibility of the plan for that of
the bankruptcy judge).
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tance by all impaired classesl--and adds the requirements
that the plan not "discriminate unfairly" and that the plan be
"fair and equitable" to the dissenting, impaired classes."9 Sub-
section 1129(b)(2)(B) goes on to define fair and equitable treat-
ment of a class of unsecured claims as either (1) paying each
claim in the class in full or (2) providing no property to the hold-
er of any claim junior to the claims of the class."' The effect of
this provision is to institute the "absolute priority rule," whereby
senior creditors must be paid in full before junior creditors, such
as the debtor's shareholders, can receive anything."' Needless
to say, this imposition provides a powerful incentive for the
debtor to negotiate a plan acceptable to as many classes as pos-
sible.
Having reviewed the relevant Code sections, the primary
question relating to the separate classification strategy is wheth-
er section 1129(a)(10) sheds any light on the classification pa-
rameters of section 1122. Although the language of section
1129(a)(10) supports arguments for both sides of the classifica-
tion controversy, proponents of separate classification put forth
the more persuasive rationale.1
2
Those opposing the separate classification strategy cite the
section 1129(a)(10) requirement that at least one impaired class
accept the plan as a necessary context for any construction of
108. See 11 U.S.C. § 11 2 9(a)(8).
109. Id. § 1129(b)(1).
110. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B).
111. Id. However, the debtor's equity holders often will attempt to retain control of
the debtor entity by employing the "new value exception" to the absolute priority
rule. See, e.g., In re Creekside Landing, Ltd., 140 B.R. 713, 715 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1992). Under this exception, a contribution of new value to the debtor by the equity
holders justifies their continued control of the entity despite the failure to pay fully
the claims of senior lienholders. Mark E. MacDonald et al., Confirmation by
Cramdown Through the New Value Exception in Single Asset Cases, 1 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 65, 69-70 (1993). The continued vitality of the new value exception has
been the topic of a vast amount of debate. Id. at 65. See generally Norwest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988) (holding that "sweat equity" did not
constitute a contribution of new value but otherwise avoiding a ruling on the doc-
trine); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the
Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 738 (1988); David A.
Skeel, The Uncertain State of an Unstated Rule: Bankruptcy's Contribution Rule Doc-
trine After Ahlers, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221 (1989).
112. See supra note 103.
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the classification provision found in section 1122."' Creditors
such as the one in Greystone believe that allowing unlimited
discretion in the classification of similar claims runs counter to
section 1129(a)(10) because such a liberal reading would permit
a debtor to isolate a small group, or even one individual claim-
ant, classify it separately, and thereby comply with section
1129(a)(10) by procuring as little as one acceptance."' Such a
result, they argue, amounts to "gerrymandering" the confirma-
tion vote and is evidence that section 1122 does not allow unfet-
tered discretion with regard to separate classification."5
This argument, however, is premised on a belief that the re-
sults of allowing separate classification of deficiency claims are,
in fact, anomalous.' 6 Actually, an investigation of the legis-
lative purpose behind the Code demonstrates that the require-
ment of acceptance by at least one impaired class remains mean-
ingful even if the Code allows the separate classification of unse-
cured deficiency claims."
First, the legislative history behind section 1129(a)(10) reveals
that Congress did not intend for section 1129(a)(10) to facilitate
the domination of the confirmation process by a large
undersecured creditor."8 According to one representative, Con-
gress intended that section 1129(a)(10) mandate that "a creditor
whose claim is impaired ... must first accept the debtor's plan
before the plan can be crammed down with respect to other im-
paired nonaccepting creditors.""' This statement clearly indi-
cates that a minority of the creditors, or in fact a sole creditor,
113. E.g., Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re
Greystone III Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1278 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 72 (1992). Section 1122 is so clear that a direct challenge to its scope would
appear impossible. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1988); supra note 24. However, creditors
maintain that the section should be interpreted to prohibit separate classification of
like claims based on other provisions of the Code. Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1278-79.
114. See Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1279; Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating
Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In re U.S. Truck Co.), 800 F.2d 581, 586 (6th Cir. 1986).
115. Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1279.
116. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 9, at 300 (decrying such a "strange result").
117. See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
118. Sather & Overstreet, supra note 3, at 369-70.
119. 126 CONG. REc. 31,917 (1980) (statement of Rep. Edwards regarding S. 658,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. tit. 1, § 107(a)(1) (1980)). S. 658 did not differ materially from
the present § 1129(a)(10). See Rusch, supra note 25, at 185-89.
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could suffice for compliance with section 1129(a)(10). As the
bankruptcy court declared in In re SM 104 Ltd.,20 "[s]ection
1129(a)(10) was intended not to give the real estate lobby a veto
power, but merely to require 'some indicia of creditor support'
for confirmation of a proposed Chapter 11 plan." 2'
The larger context of the Code's enactment, however, truly
undermines the contention that the plain meaning of the Code is
inconsistent. Congress designed the Code as a system of compro-
mises between the interests of creditors in receiving payment for
their claims and the broader interest in equitable treatment of
debtors.2 2 This balance permeates the Code and explains situ-
ations such as exist with the interplay of sections 1122 and
1129(a)(10).' 23 In this instance, the Code offers flexibility in the
classification process, which it counterbalances by requiring that
all classes accept the plan, or, under a cramdown, that at least
one impaired, non-insider class accept the plan.124 With the
cramdown alternative, in return for softening the class accep-
tance requirement, the Code mandates the fair and equitable
treatment of dissenting classes and proscribes unfair discrimina-
tion.'25
The essence of the debtor's contention is that Congress adopt-
ed the Code's provisions with the full knowledge that certain
sections would counteract others in some ways.'26 The conclu-
sion to be drawn from this seeming contradiction is not that the
Code is ambiguous, but that it is, like much legislation, the
product of compromises."' Therefore, the assertion that the
Code is incoherent, and must be fleshed out judicially, is not
persuasive in light of the congressional intent to establish a
system that balances the various interests involved. 12
120. 160 B.R. 202 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
121. Id. at 218.
122. In re ZRM-Okla. Partnership, 156 B.R. 67, 70 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993).
123. See Rusch, supra note 29, at 60-64.
124. See supra notes 80-111 and accompanying text.
125. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1988).
126. See Rusch, supra note 29, at 60-64.
127. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 61
n.12 (1982).
128. Of the 1993 bankruptcy court challenges to the Greystone line of cases, the
most direct was certainly In re ZRM-Okla., 156 B.R. 67 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993).
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The Code's plain meaning, however, does not resolve the issue
of what the classification rules should be. Clearly, a certain bal-
ance is necessary. As discussed below,'29 permitting single-as-
set real estate debtors to classify deficiency claims separately
from general unsecured claims is desirable. However, this desir-
ability does not mean that courts should permit debtors to act in
bad faith in order to attain the desired flexibility in the classi-
fication process. In all likelihood, the first court to address the
separate classification issue came the closest to striking the
proper balance.130
THE CASES
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals laid the foundation for the
current debate over the separate classification strategy in In re
U.S. Truck Co."' Although not a single-asset real estate case,
the debtor classified one creditor, who was certain to reject the
plan, separately from a similar group of claims that the debtor
expected would approve the plan.'32 The debtor, a trucking
company, admitted that it isolated the claim of the Teamsters
Committee from other similar claims for the purpose of creating
an impaired, accepting class.' 3 '
In response to the Teamsters Committee's objection that the
debtor's plan improperly manipulated the classification of claims
to comply with Code section 1129(a)(10), the court examined the
issue of which strictures apply to the classification process.' 4
Rather than entering the fray over whether deficiency claims were substantially
similar to other unsecured claims, the court in ZRM-Okla. chose to draw a line in
the Code on the issue of § 1122's "plain meaning." Id. at 70.
129. See infra notes 201-16 and accompanying text.
130. Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In re
U.S. Truck Co.), 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986); see infra notes 131-54 and accompa-
nying text.
131. 800 F.2d 581.
132. Id. at 583-84.
133. Id. at 586 n.8.
134. Id. at 585-86. In doing so, the court recognized that the legislative intent with
regard to separate classification is difficult to interpret. Although the Bankruptcy Act
forbade the practice, Congress omitted the prohibition in drafting the Code. Even
more confusing are the Notes of the Senate Judiciary Committee on § 1122, which
state that the "section codifies the current case law." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5904. The court was natu-
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The court held that Congress purposefully did not forbid the
separate classification of similar claims,'35 and that the "plain
language" of Code section 1122 does not support the contention
that classification based on any criterion other than legal right
to the debtor's assets is prohibited.'36
Nevertheless, the court did agree with the Teamsters Commit-
tee that "there must be some limit on a debtor's power to classi-
fy creditors" for the purpose of gaining an impaired, accepting
class to achieve a cramdown confirmation. 3 ' The court found
that the "one common theme in the prior case law" was that
"lower courts were given broad discretion to determine proper
classification according to the factual circumstances of each
individual case."'35 Moreover, the court held that such a deter-
mination is properly informed by an evaluation of the interests of
the creditors.'39
The Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court's decision that the
Teamsters Committee's interests were substantially different
from those in the other impaired class. "' According to the
court, the Teamsters Committee's interests were distinct be-
cause of (1) its "unique continued interest in the ongoing busi-
ness of the debtor," (2) the substantially different "mechanics of
the Teamsters Committee's claim," and (3) the likelihood that
the claim would "become part of the agenda of future collective
bargaining sessions."' Therefore, the court held that the
Teamsters Committee's claim was "in a different posture" than
rally unsure of how to address the directive, in light of the fact that the case law
referred to by the Committee came from "two provisions with different language,
that were adopted for different purposes, and that have been interpreted to mean
different things." U.S. Truck, 800 F.2d at 586.
135. U.S. Truck, 800 F.2d at 585 (quoting Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193, 201
(D.C. Cir. 1982)) ("Section 1122(a) specifies that only claims which are 'substantially
similar' may be placed in the same class. It does not require that similar claims
must be grouped together, but merely that any group created must be homoge-
nous.").
136. Id.
137. Id. at 586.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 587.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 584.
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those of the other class and was properly separated.4 2 Impor-
tantly, the court emphasized that the feasibility provision of sec-
tion 1129(a)(11) and the "fair and equitable" provision of section
1129(b)(1) would protect the Teamsters Committee's class.4
Quite possibly, the U.S. Truck decision was the high-water
mark of separate classification jurisprudence. The court accu-
rately recognized that the "plain language" of the Code simply
does not require joint classification of all similar claims.141
Nevertheless, the court gave some credence to what it perceived
to be the legislative intent behind the Code's classification
scheme by announcing that lower courts should not tolerate
abiisive classification. 145 Apparently, the court did not define
such abusive classification by reference to the intent of the debt-
or, but rather looked to the lack of any difference in interests be-
tween an isolated dissenting creditor and the interests of the
other creditors with similar claims. 46
Under this analysis, the relevant question is: What interests,
if divergent, justify separate classification? Particularly signifi-
cant in this regard is the court's statement that the Teamsters
Committee's interests were distinct from those of the other
claims because the union "may choose to reject the plan not
because the plan is less than optimal, but because the Team-
sters Committee has a noncreditor interest--e.g., rejection will
benefit its members in the ongoing employment relation-
ship." '4 This statement foreshadowed the comparable argu-
ment advanced in some single-asset cases that an undersecured
creditor's interests are different because it will be motivated to
vote its unsecured claim to benefit its secured creditor sta-
tus.
148
The parallels to the single-asset real estate situation are easi-
ly drawn. The court in U.S. Truck did not imply that the
142. Id. at 587.
143. Id. In fact, the Teamsters Committee objected unsuccessfully on both of those
grounds as well. Id. at 587-89.
144. Id. at 585.
145. Id. at 586.
146. See supra notes 14041 and accompanying text.
147. U.S. Truck, 800 F.2d at 587.
148. E.g., In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 587 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989).
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Teamsters' voting incentives were improper; rather, they provid-
ed ample justification for separate classification of the Team-
sters' claim. " 9 Likewise, although an undersecured creditor
properly may look to its overall economic interest in voting its
deficiency claim, its interest in voting its unsecured claim to
affect its secured claim gives it a different stake in the
reorganization. 5 ' Consequently,' consistent with the analysis of
U.S. Truck, a plan may place a deficiency claim in a separate
class from other unsecured claims.
Although the Code itself does not support any limitation of
the separate classification of similar claims,' 5 ' the U.S. Truck
decision, when honestly read, would place only a small and rea-
sonable burden on the practice. The requirement of U.S.
Truck-that there be a divergence of interests among the hold-
ers of similar claims as a prerequisite for separate classifica-
tion-is a far lower burden than a mandate that the claims be
dissimilar with respect to their strict legal rights. Furthermore,
this interpretation is true to the rationale behind section
1129(a)(10) that there be "some indicia of creditor support" for
the plan.'52
If all the claims sharing the same interests in the debtor's
plan must be in the same class, the debtor's plan must gain the
acceptance of at least one of these interest-based classes.'53
This acceptance would enforce the spirit of Code section
1129(a)(10). At the same time, claims with divergent interests
would be classified separately, allowing the debtor to confirm a
plan opposed by the majority creditor, or by most creditors, so
long as one interest-based class approved the plan. Considering
the strong arguments that deficiency claims are in fact legally
different,'54 U.S. Truck's relatively minor proviso should be no
149. U.S. Truck, 800 F.2d at 587.
150. See Aztec, 107 B.R. at 587.
151. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1988).
152. In re Polytherm Indus., Inc., 33 B.R. 823, 835 (W.D. Wis. 1983); supra notes
117-20 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative intent behind the amend-
ment of Code § 1129 to include the requirement of acceptance by at least one im-
paired class).
153. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (1988).
154. See, e.g., In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202, 218-19 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
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threat to single-asset debtors employing the separate classifica-
tion strategy. As intellectually consistent as it may be to support
unlimited separate classification, the adoption of an unrestric-
tive abuse-prevention standard is a more reasonable position
that also serves to ensure that Code section 1129(a)(10) is not
reduced to an absurdity.
The current controversy over single-asset cases arose with In
re Greystone III Joint Venture'55 and the line of cases that fol-
lowed in its wake. Greystone's fact pattern was archetypal. In
the late 1980s, as the real estate markets began to crumble, a
debtor owning only an Austin, Texas, office building sought and
received relief from its creditors under Chapter 11.2"6 The debt-
or, Greystone, had borrowed $8.8 million from Phoenix, a lender,
and secured it by a first lien on the property, which was worth
only $5.8 million at the date of bankruptcy. Phoenix's total claim
at the time of bankruptcy exceeded the value of the collateral by
approximately $3.5 million, and, having not elected treatment
under Code section 1111(b)(2), Phoenix had an unsecured defi-
ciency claim in that amount.'57 Meanwhile, Greystone's trade
creditors held claims of approximately $10,000."5 When the
plan was submitted, Phoenix protested Greystone's decision to
classify its claim separately from the trade creditors who sup-
ported the plan."5 9
The court in Greystone took U.S. Truck and drove it into a
ditch. Writing for a three-judge panel, Fifth Circuit Judge Edith
Jones claimed the support of U.S. Truck in holding that Code
section 1122 should be read to prohibit the separate classifica-
tion of similar claims unless "undertaken for reasons indepen-
dent of the debtor's motivation to secure the vote of an impaired,
assenting class of claims."60 In the opinion, the court surpris-
ingly announced that "one clear rule" had emerged from the
caselaw on § 1122: "[T]hou shalt not classify similar claims dif-
ferently in order to gerrymander an affirmative vote on a reorga-
155. 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992).
156. Id. at 1276-77.
157, Id. In other words, Phoenix was somewhat undersecured.
158. Id. at 1276.
159. Id. at 1277.
160. Id. at 1279.
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nization plan." 6' The court immediately followed this assertion
with the quotation from U.S Truck that "[t]here must be some
limit on a debtor's power to classify creditors in such a man-
ner."16 2 Ironically, the court then proceeded to establish a 'lim-
it" entirely inconsistent with the holding in U.S. Truck. 63 The
court in U.S. Truck had, in fact, approved the confirmation of
the debtor's plan before it, one which admittedly gerrymandered
an affirmative vote.164
In contrast to U.S Truck, the court in Greystone began by
holding that a "fair reading" of section 1122, when read in con-
junction with section 1129(a)(10), was that similar claims "ordi-
narily.., should be placed in the same class."'65 The court
then offered the section 1122(b) exception as evidence of the
correctness of its narrow reading, apparently confusing section
1122(a)'s actual language with the court's preferred reading of
the provision.'66 The court did not disguise its disdain for the
debtor's practice, insisting that separate classification renders
the deficiency claim's vote "meaningless" and allows debtors to
"disenfranchise" undersecured creditors.'67 The court added
that, "[w]ith its unsecured voting rights effectively eliminated,
the.., creditor's ability to negotiate a satisfactory settlement of
either its secured or unsecured claims would be seriously under-
cut.'
1 6 8
The court's opinion in Greystone deserves criticism because,
first, the opposition of any class of impaired claims is far from
meaningless.'69 Even with separate classification allowed, the
undersecured creditor may still dissent with its deficiency claim
161. Id.
162. Id. (quoting U.S. Truck, 800 F.2d at 586).
163. See U.S. Truck, 800 F.2d at 587.
164. Id. at 586-87.
165. Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1278.
166. See supra note 78. This convoluted logic has proved a target for several com-
mentators and jurists wishing to underscore the overreaching nature of the court's
holding. See In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202, 217 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993); Sather &
Overstreet, supra note 3, at 365-66.
167. Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1280.
168. Id.
169. See In re D & W Realty Corp., 156 B.R. 140, 141-42 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993),
rev'd, 165 B.R. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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and thereby force the debtor to employ the cramdown confirma-
tion method, with its additional protections for dissenting credi-
tors.'70 Moreover, although an unsecured creditor truly would
be in a better negotiating position if it alone could dictate
whether a debtor's plan is confirmed, the Code inconveniently
does not grant it that power by implication or otherwise.'71
The cramdown provisions were expressly instituted to provide
for plan confirmation even when some, or most, of the creditors
dissent.'72 If Congress intended to allow the largest creditor or
the majority of creditors to block cramdown confirmation, then it
would have drafted section 1129(a)(10) to require more than the
assent of a single class of creditors.'73 Furthermore, when Con-
gress did draft section 1129(a)(10), it was presumably fully
aware of the restrictions, or lack thereof, that it included in
section 1122.' 4
Having mangled both the Code and the holding in U.S. Truck,
the court in Greystone proceeded to rebuke hypocritically the
bankruptcy court for its approval of the plan.'75 Because the
bankruptcy court based its decision, in part, on the "Code's poli-
cy of facilitating reorganization," the Fifth Circuit excoriated it
for the sin of "resort[ing]" to a policy argument.'76 Without dis-
puting the existence of such a policy, the circuit court stated
that "[p] olicy' considerations do not justify preferring one section
of the Code, much less elevating its implicit 'policies' over other
sections, where the statutory language draws no such distinc-
tions."'77 This declaration is, shamelessly, only a few para-
graphs after the court "elevated" its own idea of the policies
underlying section 1129(a)(10) over the statutory language of
section 1122.178
It is not clear exactly what reasons the debtor advanced in
170. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(8), 1129(b)(1) (1988).
171. See id. § 1129 (providing for cramdown despite the existence of a dissenting
class).
172. See In re ZRM-Okla. Partnership, 156 B.R. 67, 71 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1280.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1278-80.
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arguing that the deficiency claim was dissimilar from the other
secured claims, mainly because they were summarily dismissed
by the circuit court. Nonetheless, Greystone apparently main-
tained that Phoenix's lack of recourse for its loan under state
law rendered Phoenix's claim "legal[ly] differen[t]" from the
claims of the trade creditors.' 9 As the court held, the simple
fact that Phoenix had no recourse under state law is not suffi-
cient to make the claim substantially dissimilar from the other
unsecured claims. Presumably, a distinction sufficient for sepa-
rate classification must lie between the legal rights of the claims
as they exist in the bankruptcy proceeding.'8 Despite this re-
quirement, the fact that Code section 1111(b) creates an unse-
cured deficiency claim where it would not otherwise exist does
affect the legal rights of the claim in several other ways, which
became the basis of several of the ensuing defections from
Greystone's mandate.'5 '
Although In re ZRM-Oklahoma Partnership'82 carried the
banner for unlimited discretion regarding classification of sim-
ilar claims,'83 two other 1993 cases mounted challenges to
Greystone's basic assumption that deficiency claims are substan-
tially similar to other unsecured claims in their legal rights. In
In re SM 104 Ltd.,' 4 the bankruptcy court accurately de-
scribed Greystone and its progeny as turning more on "notions of
basic fairness and good faith" than on principles of statutory
construction. ' The court cited as persuasive the argument
found in In re Aztec, and inspired by U.S. Truck, that unsecured
deficiency claims are properly placed in a separate class due to
the claimholder's unique interest in affecting its secured claim
179. Id. at 1279. In addition, Greystone advanced "good business reasons" for the
classification. Id. at 1280.
180. Id. at 1278. The court also implicitly recognized that the existence of good
business reasons would provide a justification for separate classification but held
that the lower court's finding of fact in this regard was clearly erroneous. Id. at
1280-81.
181. See In re D & W Realty, 156 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd, 165 B.R.
127 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
182. 156 B.R. 67 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993).
183. The court based its holding on the plain meaning of Code § 1122. Id. at 71.
184. 160 B.R. 202 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
185. Id. at 217.
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by preventing the confirmation of any plan.'86 Nonetheless, the
court chose to base its holding on the "significant differences
between the legal rights of a general unsecured claim and an
unsecured deficiency claim created for the nonrecourse lender by
section 1111(b)." 87
Foremost among those differences was the section 1111(b)
aspect itself and in particular the fact that such a claim would
not exist under a different chapter of the Code.'88 Distinguish-
ing its criticism from a mere assertion that a deficiency claim is
different because of how it is created, the court in SM 104 Ltd.
explained that the present rights of the deficiency claimholder
are affected by its status.'89 The court used the "best interests
of the creditors" test to demonstrate the- continuing viability of
the distinction, noting that joint classification could lead to an
undersecured creditor demanding to receive better treatment
than it would deserve under Chapter 7, a result clearly not con-
templated by the Code. 90 Thus, the court reasoned, the legal
rights of the two categories are sufficiently divergent to render
the claims substantially dissimilar and to require separate clas-
sification under section 1122.'
The court in In re D & W Realty Corp."' created an entirely
186. Id. at 218.
187. Id. at 219.
188. See 11 U.S.C. § 1111 (1988). Section 1111 only applies to Chapter 11 cases,
and, according to Code § 502(b)(1), nonrecourse lenders would otherwise, for example
in Chapter 7 cases, have no unsecured claim at all. Id. §§ 502, 1111.
189. SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. at 218-21.
190. Id. at 219-20. Under any liquidation analysis that demonstrated that the unse-
cured creditors would receive a distribution from the Chapter 7 estate, the unse-
cured deficiency claim, if required to be in the same class, can piggyback onto some
undeserved benefits. Id. Code § 1123 requires that each claim within a class receive
the same treatment or agree to accept the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (1988). Thus,
when the general unsecured creditors demand, for example, a 15% payment on their
claims based on the best interests test, the deficiency claimant can demand the
same and block confirmation if not paid. See SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. at 219-20. This
situation is true despite the fact that, under Chapter 7, the nonrecourse
undersecured creditor would have no unsecured claim and could look only to the
collateral to satisfy its lien. Id.
191. SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. at 221.
192. 156 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd, 165 B.R. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Al-
though the district court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision in D & W Realty,
the bankruptcy court's opinion remains an interesting criticism of the Greystone line
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new approach to the issue. The court admitted that there could
be some limitation of separate classification'93 but nonetheless
maintained that the separate classification of deficiency claims
of undersecured mortgagees "is not only appropriate, it is in fact
mandated" by the election provision of Code section 1111(b).'
Section 1111(b), which gives effect to unsecured deficiency
claims through its recourse provision, also directs that a claim
may forego such recourse and be treated as secured to the full
extent of the allowed claim. To select this status, "the class of
which such claim is a part" may elect treatment under section
1111(b)(2). The court in D & W Realty reasoned that if the elec-
tion is to be made by a class, then only claimants entitled to
make the election should be in that class.'95 Noting that the
section 1111(b) election cannot be required before the plan and
disclosure statement are filed, 9 ' the court held that unsecured
deficiency claims must be classified separately in the plan in
order to preserve the right of election in the future."' In man-
dating such classification, the court found the issue of the
debtor's subjective intent to be irrelevant.9 8
SM 104 Ltd. and D & W Realty successfully challenge
Greystone on its own terms. Even if section 1122 does contem-
plate some restriction on separately classifying similar claims,
SM 104 Ltd. and D & W Realty both convincingly establish that
classifying deficiency claims separately from general unsecured
of cases.
193. Id. at 143. In fact the decision leaves intact an earlier holding by the same
bankruptcy court that general unsecured claims may not be separately classified
from each other. See In re Mastercraft Record Plating, Inc., 32 B.R. 106 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 39 B.R. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
194. D & W Realty, 156 B.R. at 141.
195. Id. at 144. Understating the matter somewhat, the court noted that "[alny
secured creditor wishing to make the election would surely object to its election
being defeated by the votes of claimants not personally entitled to make the elec-
tion." Id.
196. D & W Realty arose at the hearing on the disclosure statement, when the §
1111(b) election was still clearly in prospect. Nevertheless, the court noted that
Bankruptcy Rule 3014 provides that the election may be made "at any time prior to
the conclusion of the hearing on the disclosure statement or within such later time
as the court may fix," and that Bankruptcy Rule 9006(c)(2) precludes the reduction
of the time to take action under Bankruptcy Rule 3014. Id.
197. Id. at 145.
198. Id.
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claims cannot fall within any such restriction. The two cases
travel different but equally valid paths to reach the same legal
conclusion: Deficiency claims must be separately classified re-
gardless of whether the debtor intends to obtain thereby an
assenting, impaired class.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The primary policy consideration in this area is well stated by
the court in D & W Realty: "Does the right to vote on a Chapter
11 plan mean the right to control the process?"199 In other
words, does allowing the undersecured mortgagee in a single-
asset real estate case to block any proposed plan of reorganiza-
tion produce a desirable outcome?..
Because single-asset debtors employing the classification
strategy usually seek to effect a cramdown confirmation, such
debtors truly are attempting to manipulate the voting process.
Similarly, however, when undersecured creditors vote their un-
secured claims in a manner that benefits their secured creditor
status, they too are taking advantage of the tools that the Code
provides them. Accordingly, courts must determine whether the
rule should allow both practices and open the possibility of con-
firmation over the objection of the undersecured creditor.
Significant in this regard is the relationship between state
property law rights and the policies of the Code. The status that
secured creditors enjoy under state property law constitutes one
rationale for prohibiting separate classification.2 ' Because the
Code's provisions generally accord creditors recognition reflective
of their state law rights,0 2 those rights are important in eval-
uating how the Code should treat a particular creditor. In addi-
tion, state law arguably indicates the policies that are in the
best interests of all concerned.
Nevertheless, the status of an undersecured nonrecourse
mortgagee under state property laws should not be exaggerated.
199. Id. at 143.
200. See Rusch, supra note 29, at 60-64 (asserting that rejecting separate classifica-
tion effectively eliminates the possibility of cramdown).
201. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924 (West 1993).
202. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-560 (1988).
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If permitted to block plan confirmation, such a creditor will be
entitled only to foreclose on the property and will therefore be
limited in its recovery to the value of the collateral."3 In con-
trast, the bankruptcy law potentially facilitates the reorganiza-
tion of the debtor but subjects the debtor to numerous
protections offered to the undersecured creditor."4 Under the
cramdown alternative, the creditor is the beneficiary of the sec-
tion 1129(b) requirement that the plan be fair and equitable and
not discriminate unfairly, the good faith requirement of section
1129(a)(3), the "best interests" test of section 1129(a)(7), the
feasibility requirement of section 1129(a)(11), and the section
1111(b) recourse election. 25 Thus, the Code offers significant
concessions to the creditor in exchange for the creditor's losing
only the power to dictate the terms of reorganization. Nonethe-
less, perhaps secured creditors should not be forced into the bar-
gain no matter how reasonable their treatment. °8
The ultimate question, then, is whether single-asset debtors
merit the opportunity to reorganize at the expense of the se-
cured creditor's right to foreclose. Congress, and in fact the na-
tion, has been well served by the policy of attempting to strike a
balance between the interests of creditors and the interest in
allowing debtors to reorganize under conditions that indicate the
prospect of an equitable and successful rehabilitation. In this
way, the benefits of maintaining the going concern value of a
debtor-entity are achieved with the least possible disruption of
the state law rights of creditors. Reserving the possibility of
reorganization for single-asset debtors advances such a balance.
The principle benefit of allowing separate classification of defi-
ciency claims is to prevent the secured creditor from possessing
a "plan veto"2 7 that it may exercise without regard to the mer-
its of the plan. Toward the end of encouraging a negotiated
203. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924.
204. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1111(b), 1129(a)(3), 1129(a)(7), 1129(a)(11), 1129(b) (1988).
205. See statutes cited supra note 204.
206. See Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone
III Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72
(1992).
207. See In re ZRM-Okla. Partnership, 156 B.R. 67, 70-71 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1993).
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reorganization plan, if an equitable plan is feasible, the Code
ideally should allocate some leverage to both sides. The
cramdown confirmation process promotes such a balance. Al-
though permitting separate classification opens the prospect of a
reorganization, it does not approximate "disenfranchisement" of
the secured creditor."' The protections enumerated above,
principally the ability to preclude regular confirmation, place the
creditor in a position to object to any plan that is unfair, dis-
criminatory, or not feasible.0 9 The result will be a plan that
ultimately may or may not gain confirmation but will remain
consistent with the values that inspired the creation of the
cramdown confirmation process.
The final issue is whether there should exist any restraint
whatsoever on a debtor's ability to separately classify similar
claims. Stated differently, as a matter of policy, are the concerns
Congress sought to address through Code section 1129(a)(10)21 °
frustrated by permitting total freedom of classification?
Although the requirement of section 1129(a)(10) (that there be
one assenting, non-insider, impaired class) is indicative at least
of an intention to check the ability of a debtor to cramdown a
plan to which no creditor would agree, arguably, the debtor's
freedom is otherwise not limited. 11 Courts such as Greystone
have chosen to read the section 1129(a)(10), in conjunction with
section 1122, as proscribing the separate classification strategy
mostly on the theory that all unsecured claims are legally simi-
lar and that the debtor has no good reason to separately classify
the deficiency claimant. 2 According to these courts, it follows
that such separate classification offends section 1129(a)(10).213
Nevertheless, a scheme that provides meaning to section
1129(a)(10) while permitting the separate classification strategy
208. But see Meltzer, supra note 9, at 301-02 (arguing that permitting separate
classification disenfranchises a dissenting lender).
209. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(11), 1129(b)(1) (1988).
210. Id. § 1129(a)(10).
211. Id.
212. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III
Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1276-81 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72
(1992).
213. Id.
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is conceivable.
The interest-based approach of U.S. Truck fills this role su-
perbly.214 By focusing the inquiry on the interests of the
claimholders placed in each class, the purpose of requiring at
least one impaired class to accept the plan is achieved. Under
this scheme, the class of creditors representing at least one set
of interests must accept the plan, an idea remarkably in line
with the congressional intent of ensuring that there was "some
indicia of... support" for the plan among impaired credi-
tors.215 The interest-based approach of U.S. Truck honors this
intent, while retaining the flexibility of classification inherent in
the words of the Code.216
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Code as written fairly may be interpreted to place abso-
lutely no restriction on the separate classification of similar
claims. 1' As discussed above," 8  however, Code section
1129(a)(10)-requiring the acceptance of at least one class of
non-insider, impaired claims-is meaningful only if there is
some restriction on the ability of a debtor to isolate one or more
selected claims in a class by itself. Where Greystone ignored the
real differences between deficiency claims and general unsecured
claims that mandate their separate classification," 9 other
courts have not heeded the intent behind Code section
1129(a)(10). 2 °
This Note argues that a return to the jurisprudence of U.S.
214. See Teamsters Natl Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In
re U.S. Truck Co.), 800 F.2d 581 (1986); supra notes 130-53 and accompanying text.
215. In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202, 218 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
216. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1988).
217. Id.
218. See supra notes 199-208 and accompanying text.
219. SM 104 Ltd. and D & W Realty Corp. properly determined that, regardless of
a deficiency claim holders' interests, a deficiency claim is legally dissimilar from
those of general unsecured claims. In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202, 218-19 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1993); In re D & W Realty Corp., 156 B.R. 140, 141 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1993), rev'd, 165 B.R. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
220. Neither SM 104 Ltd. nor D & W Realty suggested any bar to the separate
classification of even one trade creditor to meet the requirements of Code §
1129(a)(10). See SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202; D & W Realty, 156 B.R. 140.
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Truck, whether achieved by interpretation or Code amendment,
is the best course. Courts should recognize that debtors general-
ly have the right to classify separately those claims held by
creditors with substantially different interests in the prospective
reorganized debtor. By definition, holders of deficiency claims
will always have distinct interests from other unsecured credi-
tors. The result would be a meaningful requirement that there
be support for the plan from at least one group of creditors situ-
ated similarly with respect to both legal rights and outlook on
the reorganization. Such a system would prevent abuse yet still
allow the option of a cramdown confirmation over the objection
of any one creditor.
CONCLUSION
The separate classification of the unsecured claim of an
undersecured creditor is simply not prohibited by the Code, nor
should it be. A feasible and fair reorganization plan should not
be subject to the veto power of the real estate mortgagee when
no such provision exists in the Code. Moreover, the legal differ-
ences of deficiency claims and the section 1111 election process
require separate classification in the single-asset real estate con-
text. As a general rule, the U.S. Truck decision should be imple-
mented, allowing the highest level of classification flexibility
while still guarding against absurd classification schemes.
King F. Tower
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